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Cite as: 95 B.R. 622
In
re Curtis E. Klefstad, Joanne R. Klefstad, Debtors
Bankruptcy Case No. 85-02429-11
In re Circle P. Farms, Inc., Debtor
Bankruptcy Case No. 86-00456-11
In re Larry J. Lentz, Judith P. Lentz, Debtors
Bankruptcy Case No. 86-00153-11
In re Lentz Farms, Inc., Debtor
Bankruptcy Case No. 86-00154-11
United States Bankruptcy Court
W.D. Wisconsin, Eau Claire Division
July 22, 1988
L.R. Reinstra, Reinstra, VanDyk & Needham, New
Richmond, Wis., for debtors.
Pamela J. Kahler, Menomonie, Wis., for Dunn County.
Susan M. Zabel, Barron, Wis., for Barron County.
Thomas S. Utschig, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION, FINDINGS OF FACT,
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The identical issue is presented in all four of the above-captioned bankruptcy cases.
The debtors by their attorney, L. R. Reinstra, have brought motions pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§§ and 505 requesting the Court to determine the status of real estate tax penalties in
their respective Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. Specifically, the debtors ask the Court to
disallow the imposition of postpetition real estate tax penalties. The taxing authorities
Dunn County and Barron County appear by their attorneys Pamela J. Kahler and Susan M.
Zabel, respectively, and contend that the tax penalties should be allowed. The parties
have submitted the issues to the Court for determination through briefs.
In Wisconsin, all real estate taxes levied on a parcel of land become a lien on the
parcel of land. Wis. Stat. § 74.01.(1) Interest is
assessed on overdue or delinquent real estate taxes at a rate of one percent per month.
Wis. Stat. 74.80(1).(2) It is further provided that
counties or cities may by ordinance impose a penalty of up to 0.5% per month in
addition to the interest on the overdue or delinquent real estate taxes.(3)
It is not disputed that, absent the bankruptcy, the real estate tax interest, and penalty
assessments would become a lien on the real estate under § 74.01 of the Wisconsin
Statutes.(4) "When a bankruptcy [is] filed, however,
the priority of liens as set forth by Congress in the Bankruptcy Code governs." In
re Cropper Co., 63 B.R. 874, 876 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1986). "[The] Bankruptcy Code
governs in determining the priority of liens in [a] bankruptcy case." In re
Hirsch-Franklin, Enterprises, Inc., 63 B.R. 864, 868 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1986).
It is clear that the prepetition real estate taxes, interest, and penalties to the date
a Chapter 11 petition is filed all constitute liens against the real estate. 11 U.S.C. §
502(b). It is well established that postpetition interest on prepetition real estate taxes
and postpetition real estate taxes and interest act as a lien against the real estate on
which they are assessed. Maryland Nat'l. Bank v. Mayor & City of Baltimore, 723
F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Stanford, 826 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. l987).(5) Hence, the only issue remaining is how to treat the
postpetition penalty on the prepetition real estate taxes and the penalty on the
postpetition real estate taxes.
Penalties are not in harmony with the overall philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code which
is to effectuate a fair and equitable distribution of the assets of the estate to
creditors. In re Tastyeast, Inc., 126 F.2d 879 (3rd Cir. 1942). A penalty is
discordant with this philosophy because it serves the function of preferring one creditor
at a detriment to other creditors of the estate. "A bankruptcy court is essentially a
court of equity and will therefore not enforce a penalty." Id. at 881. The Court
notes that oversecured creditors are generally allowed interest on their claims but they
are not allowed penalties. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).(6) However,
the Code does allow for an administrative expense priority for any penalty relating to
"...any tax incurred by the estate, except a tax of a kind specified in section
507(a)(7) of this title;" 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(B). See In re Bergin Corp,77
B.R. 210 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987), and Matter of Patch Press, 71 B.R. 345 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1987). Accordingly, the Court does allow the postpetition penalty on
postpetition tax as an administrative expense.
The counties argue that the imposition of the tax penalty is actually another form of
interest and not punitive in nature. They cite In re Norton, 77 B.R. 682 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1987), in support of this proposition. This reliance on Norton is
misplaced. In Norton the ordinances creating the penalties were not enacted until
after the filing of the debtor's Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and the counties were
stayed from imposing penalties on prepetition taxes.
There is a presumption that penalties assessed on tax deficiencies are punitive and the
taxing entity must show otherwise in order to rebut this presumption. In re Patco Photo
Corp., 82 B.R. 192 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1988). When a taxing entity assesses both
penalties and interest it is unlikely that a compensatory role is provided by both the
penalty and the interest. In re Hirsch-Franklin, Enterprises, Inc., 63 B.R. 864,
873 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1986); see also In re New England Carpet Co., 26 B.R. 934
(Bankr. Vt. 1983). In the case at hand it appears that the imposition of a penalty of 6%
on top of interest of 12% is punitive. In any event, the taxing entities have not provided
sufficient argument to rebut the presumption that the penalties are in fact punitive.
In conclusion, generally there is no personal liability for real estate taxes in
Wisconsin.(7) Instead, real estate taxes act as a lien upon
the property against which they are assessed, superior to all other liens. Under state law
the interest and penalties associated with the real estate tax would also become a lien on
the property. After a bankruptcy petition is filed, the Bankruptcy Code provides a
different system of priority. The real estate taxes and interest represent a benefit to
the property and the estate, and the Bankruptcy Code allows for the perfection of the
counties' pre-existing interests in the real estate to this extent while treating
penalties on qualified taxes as an administrative expense. However, the postpetition
penalty on the prepetition tax is punitive in nature. The Bankruptcy Code does not allow
for the imposition of this penalty because it would deprive other creditors of their fair
share.
This decision shall constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance
with Bankruptcy Rule 7052.
END NOTES:
1. 74.01 Lien of taxes on land, and on timber; levy. All taxes
levied upon any tract or parcel of land and all costs, charges and interest thereon shall
be a lien thereon until paid except as otherwise provided by law; and all costs and
expenses which shall accrue jointly or in the aggregate on two or more tracts or parcels
shall be apportioned in equal parts upon such several tracts or parcels; and all taxes
levied upon any lands and all costs, charges and interest thereon shall also be a lien on
all logs, wood and timber cut upon such lands subsequent to the first day of January in
the year in which such taxes are levied; and it shall be the duty of the town treasurer,
or if such taxes be returned uncollected, of the county treasurer, to pursue and levy upon
such logs, wood or timber, wherever the same may be, and collect such tax by distress and
sale of the same in the manner provided by law for the distress and sale of personal
property for the payment of taxes.
History: 1977 c. 29 s. 1646(3)
2. 74.80 Interest and penalty on overdue and delinquent taxes.
(1) The interest rate on overdue or delinquent real estate taxes, personal property
taxes and special assessments is one percent per month or fraction of a month.
(2)(a) The board of any county or the city council of any city authorized by law to
collect and sell its own taxes may by ordinance impose a penalty of up to 0.5% per month
or fraction of a month, in addition to the interest under sub. (1), on any overdue or
delinquent real estate taxes and special assessments. The governing body of any city,
village or town may, by ordinance, impose a penalty of up to 0.5% per month or fraction of
a month, in addition to the interest under sub. (1), on any overdue or delinquent personal
property taxes.
(b) Any ordinance enacted under par. (a) may specify that the penalty under this
subsection shall apply to any real estate taxes and special assessments, or to any
personal property taxes, that are overdue or delinquent on the effective date of the
ordinance. The ordinance may specify that the penalty under this subsection shall apply to
any real estate taxes and special assessments, or to any personal property taxes, that
become overdue or delinquent on or after January 1, 1982. The ordinance may specify that
any or all of the real estate taxes and special assessments on an owner-occupied residence
or farm is not subject to the penalty under this subsection. The ordinance may specify
that the county treasurer shall exclude the additional revenue generated by the penalty
from the distributions required by ss. 74.03(7) and 74.031(12)(c) and (d).
3. See footnote 2 above.
4. The Court notes en passant that the word
"penalty" is conspicuously absent in § 74.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
However, case law suggests that the penalty may become a lien on the land along with the
tax and interest. Munkwitz Realty and Investment Company v. Diederich Schaefer Co.,
231 Wis. 504, 286 N.W. 30 (1939); Westby v. Bekkedal, 172 Wis. 114, 178 N.W. 451
(1920).
5. Generally, § 362(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code "operates as
a stay, applicable to all entities, of ... any act to create, perfect, or enforce
any lien against property of the estate." (emphasis added) 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).
This stay also "prevents taxing authorities from asserting liens against [property]
in order to insure or compel payment of post-petition taxes." In re Trowbridge,
74 B.R. 484 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Carlisle Court, Inc., 36 B.R. 209 (Bankr.
D.C. 1983).
An exception to § 362(a)(4) is created in § 362(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code:
(b) The filing of a petition under section
301, 302, or 303 of this title, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a
stay--
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of
any act to perfect an interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights
and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this title or to the
extent that such act is accomplished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A)
of this title; (emphasis added)
11 U.S.C. § 546(b) provides:
(b) The rights and powers of a trustee under
sections 544, 545, and 549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law that
permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an
entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of such perfection. If such
law requires seizure of such property or commencement of an action to accomplish such
perfection, and such property has not been seized or such action has not been commenced
before the date of the filing of the petition such interest in such property shall be
perfected by notice within the time fixed by such law for such seizure or commencement.
(emphasis added)
While these two sections allow creditors to perfect liens after
the filing of a bankruptcy petition, they do not allow the creation of liens. In re New
England Carpet Co., 26 B.R. 934 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983):
[5] Section 362(a)(4) of the Code
specifically stays "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against
property of the estate..." (emphasis supplied), upon the filing of the petition. In
contrast, Section 362(b)(3) specifically excepted "any act to perfect an
interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to
such perfection under section 546(b)..." (emphasis supplied). While there should be
no doubt that Section 362(b)(3) excepts the perfection of certain liens, it is
manifestly as clear that creation, as opposed to perfection, is not
excepted.
Id. at 939.
[3,4] Section 362(a)(4) stays acts to
"create, perfect or enforce" a lien. In contrast, subsection (b)(3) only
provides an exception for acts "to perfect" liens. It is through a comparison of
these two subsections that the court finds that in order for acts to perfect a lien to be
excepted from the automatic stay, a creditor's underlying interest must be created prior
to the petition.
In re North Side Lumber Co., 59 B.R. 917, 921 (Bankr. D. Or.
1986). However, the imposition of an in rem real estate tax may merely be a
perfection of a pre-existing interest in the real estate that the taxing entity already
possessed. In re Electric City, Inc., 43 B.R. 336, 343 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1984).
Where, however, immovable and ever present
real estate is at issue, the State's interest in the property for the purposes of real
estate taxation is a very real and not-to-be-doubted interest that pre-exists a petition
in bankruptcy. The imposition of the lien representing the taxes due for any given tax
year is but the manifestation, or perfection, of that underlying interest.
Maryland Nat'l. Bank v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
723 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1983). Real estate taxes directly benefit the property to which
they are assessed by providing for certain services with respect to such property as in
protection from vandalism and maintenance of streets and roads. They further indirectly
benefit the property by the general benefit of the community for which the taxes are used.
Id. Accordingly, real estate taxes are not stayed from being a lien on property of
the estate. In re Stanford, 826 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1987). To the extent interest or
penalties are not punitive, they also may become a lien on real estate to the extent
provided under state law. However, punitive interest and penalties may not become a
postpetition lien on real estate, because they do not benefit the property or the
bankruptcy estate and are a direct detriment to creditors.
6. As to the various legal theories allowing postpetition interest
to secured creditors on prepetition claims under 506(b), see Stevenson, Taxing
Authorities, Section 506(b) and the Curious Comma, 61 American Bankruptcy Law Journal
275 (1987).
7. However, Wis. Stat. 74.58(2) states:
A 1st class city may proceed against real
property, the property owner or both to collect delinquent real estate taxes and other
costs. |